



Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co.
v. Haslip, et al.,
U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 1032,
No. 89-1279 (Mar. 4, 1991).
Supreme Court Upholds Jury
Discretion Over Punitive Damages
In a 7-1 decision, the U.S. Supreme
Court rejected a constitutional attack on
punitive damages, leaving juries with
broad discretion over damage awards.
Writing for the majority, Justice Harry A.
Blackmun acknowledged that the consti-
tutional requirement of due process of
law applies to the awarding of punitive
damages, and that some awards might be
so "extreme" as to violate due process.
However, Blackmun noted that due pro-
cess is satisfied when "the discretion is
exercised within reasonable constraints."
The case arose when Cleopatra
Haslip, a city employee in Roosevelt
City, Alabama, incurred $3,500 in hospi-
tal expenses and -discovered that her
insurance policy had lapsed. The insur-
ance agent who handled policies for
Roosevelt City's employees had misap-
propriated the city's premiums and inter-
cepted cancellation notices, so workers
were never warned about their cancelled
coverage. Because Haslip was unable to
pay her medical expenses, her physician
placed her account with a collection
agency, which obtained a judgment
against Haslip, adversely affecting her
credit. Haslip filed suit against the agent;
she also named Pacific Mutual as a
defendant under a theory of respondeat
superior. An Alabama jury awarded
Haslip over $1 million, which included
compensation for her expenses plus at
least $840,000 in punitive damages. The
Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the
award.
Pacific Mutual appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court, claiming that the award
was "the product of unbridled jury dis-
cretion" which violated its due process
rights. In upholding the punitive dam-
ages award, the Supreme Court conced-
ed that it could not "draw a mathematical
bright line between the constitutionally
acceptable and the constitutionally unac-
ceptable that would fit every case."
However, the Court noted that "general
concerns of reasonableness and adequate
guidance from the court when the case is
tried to a jury properly enter into the con-
stitutional calculus."
The Court reviewed the jury instruc-
tions regarding punitive damages which
were provided by the trial court, and
found that they "reasonably accommo-
dated Pacific Mutual's interest in rational
decisionmaking and Alabama's interest
in meaningful individualized assessment
of appropriate deterrence and retribu-
tion." Further, the Court determined that
a variety of procedural protections
impose a sufficiently definite and mean-
ingful constraint on the discretion of
Alabama factfinders in awarding puni-
tive damages; the Court concluded that
Pacific Mutual enjoyed the benefit of all
such protections.
Renne v. Geary,
__ U.S. ____ S.Ct. __
No. 90-669 (Jan. 14, 1991).
Supreme Court to Review
California's Ban on Party Endorsements
for Nonpartisan Offices
On January 14, the U.S. Supreme
Court agreed to review the Ninth Cir-
cuit's August 1990 en banc decision that
Article II, section 6(b) of the California
Constitution, which provides that no
political party or party central committee
may endorse, support, or oppose a candi-
date for nonpartisan office, violates the
first and fourteenth amendments of the
federal constitution. (See CRLR Vol. 10,
No. 4 (Fall 1990) p. 189 and Vol. 9, No.
4 (Fall 1989) p. 139 for extensive back-
ground information on this case.)
NINTH CIRCUIT COURT
OF APPEALS
Lancaster Community Hospital v.
Antelope Valley Hospital District,
923 F.2d 1378, 90 D.A.R. 848,
Nos. 89-55167, 89-55347
(Jan. 18, 1991).
State Action Immunity Does Not Shield
Hospital District from Antitrust Laws
In this proceeding, the U.S. Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
state action immunity doctrine does not
shield a California hospital district from
federal antitrust laws. Lancaster Com-
munity Hospital brought suit against
Antelope Valley Hospital, District and
Medical Group (collectively Antelope)
based on federal antitrust laws and the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga-
nizations (RICO) Act. Lancaster alleged
that Antelope tried to use its monopoly
in perinatal care services to increase its
market share in non-perinatal services.
In support of its position, Antelope
argued that he broad authority delegated
to it by the state to provide hospital ser-
vices in and of itself established authori-
ty to exclude others from providing hos-
pital services. The district court granted
Antelope's motion for summary judg-
ment based in part on the state action
immunity doctrine.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed,
stating that "when a state delegates
authority to a subordinate entity that then
acts anticompetitively, the subordinate is
not automatically beyond the reach of
antitrust." The court pointed out that
Antelope did not show it was acting
within a "clearly articulated" state policy
to displace competition. The court also
determined that the state gave Antelope
no power to regulate the hospital ser-
vices market, but merely authorized
Antelope to provide hospital services
along with regular competitors.
Moreover, the court found that Califor-
nia's legislative history indicates that the
state has committed itself to a competi-
tive market. Thus, Antelope was not
afforded state action immunity.
However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court's dismissal of the RICO
claim, stating that the RICO claim
against Antelope fails because "govern-
ment entities are incapable of forming
malicious intent....A specific intent to
deceive is an element of the predicate
act, mail fraud, on which Lancaster's
RICO claim is based." The court noted
that the fraud alleged by Lancaster "is in
reality nothing more or less than anti-
competitive conduct. This conduct may
be unacceptable, but it is not 'fraud."'
Erdman v. Cochise County,
926 F.2d 877, 91 D.A.R. 2141,
No. 89-16015 (Feb. 22, 1991).
Offer of Judgment is Valid Against City
Even if Fee Award Exclusion Omitted
The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals determined that a waiver of
attorneys' fees must be clear and unam-
biguous in 42 U.S.C. section 1983 civil
rights settlements or offers of judgment
under Rule 68, Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The matter arose when James
Erdman filed a suit against the City of
Yuma and Cochise County for damages
and injunctive relief, alleging that previ-
ous incarcerations constituted ouble
jeopardy and violated the fourth and
fourteenth amendments. After holding
settlement negotiations, the city made an
offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 to
allow a judgment to be taken against it
for $7,500 "with costs now accrued."
Erdman and his attorney assumed the
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offer meant $7,500 plus attorneys' fees,
and accepted it; the city countered that
the offer made was intended to include
attorneys' fees but was "inartfully draft-
ed." The trial court rescinded the offer
without a hearing based on mutual mis-
take.
The Ninth Circuit reversed and
remanded in part and affirmed in part.
The court determined that costs in sec-
tion 1983 actions automatically include
attorneys' fees to prevailing plaintiffs
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. section 1988;
therefore, the settlement agreement as
drafted by the city was construed in Erd-
man's favor. Further, the court held that
"any waiver or limitation of attorney
fees in settlements of section 1983 cases
must be clear and unambiguous."
CALIFORNIA SUPREME
COURT
Tamela Harris, et al., v.
Capital Growth Investors XIV, et al.,
52 Cal. 3d 1142, 278 Cal. Rptr. 614,
No. S011367 (Feb. 28, 1991).
Landlord's Minimum Income Policy
Does Not Violate Unruh Act
In this proceeding, the California
Supreme Court ruled that a landlord's
minimum income requirements do not
violate California's Unruh Civil Rights
Act, Civil Code section 51 et seq.; the
restrictive opinion is among several
recent decisions which have dramatical-
ly affected civil rights law in California.
Tamela Harris and Muriel Jordan
(Harris) sued Capital Growth Investors
(Capital), managers and owners of apart-
ment buildings, for denying them the
opportunity to rent. Capital had a mini-
mum income policy requiring tenants to
have gross monthly income of at least
three times the rent to be charged. Harris
argued that the policy constituted arbi-
trary economic discrimination and that
the minimum income policy has an
adverse or disparate impact on women,
since women "generally have lower
average incomes than males."
The trial court sustained Capital's
demurrers and dismissed the case. The
Third District Court of Appeal reversed
as to the economic discrimination claim,
holding that it raised factual issues con-
cerning the alleged arbitrariness of Capi-
tal's practice that required a trial; it
affirmed as to the sex-discrimination-by-
adverse-impact claim.
In a 5-2 decision, the California
Supreme Court reversed the appellate
court's decision, holding that "[e]co-
nomic and financial distinctions are not
among the impermissible classifications
listed in the [Unruh Act]." Although the
court had previously expanded the pro-
tection of the civil rights statute in areas
not specifically listed in the Act, the
court decided that minimum income
requirements seek to further the legiti-
mate interest of business establishments
in controlling financial risk while pro-
viding goods on a nondiscriminatory
basis.
The court refused to apply the "dis-
parate impact test" used by federal
courts in employment discrimination
cases, stating that there is no authority
for extending the test "to a general dis-
crimination-in-public-accommodations
statute like the Unruh Act."
Retiring Justice Allen Broussard
strongly dissented, noting that "it was
well established that the Unruh Civil
Rights Act protected the citizens of Cali-
fornia against all arbitrary discrimination
in the marketplace. In full retreat from
the goal of equal access and opportunity,
the majority today limit the Act so as to
insulate invidious discrimination on the
basis of economic class from legal
redress." Justice Stanley Mosk separate-
ly dissented, finding that Harris had stat-
ed a facially valid claim for discrimina-
tion, necessitating a trial to determine
whether the minimum income policy
was arbitrary or unreasonable.
CALIFORNIA COURTS
OF APPEAL
Bank of the West v. Superior Court
(Industrial Indemnity, Real Party in
Interest),
226 Cal. App. 3d 835,
277 Cal. Rptr. 219,
No. A050298 (Jan. 4, 1991).
Ambiguity Requires Broad Definition
of "Unfair Competition" in Policy
In this proceeding, the principal issue
presented for determination is whether
the phrase "unfair competition" in a
standard form comprehensive general
liability policy (CGL) giving rise to
advertising injury is limited to the nar-
row tort as defined in common law (i.e.,
passing off the goods of a business rival
as one's own) or whether it also includes
the statutory definition which describes
unfair competition broadly so as to
embrace all unlawful, unfair, or fraudu-
lent business practices.
Industrial Indemnity Company of
Hawaii, Ltd. (Industrial) insured Bank of
the West under a CGL policy. In two
separate actions, Bank of the West (or its
predecessor) was alleged to have com-
mitted acts of unfair competition. In both
actions, Industrial denied coverage and
refused to indemnify or contribute to the
Bank's defense costs. Industrial argued,
inter alia, that the phrase "unfair compe-
tition" giving rise to injury in advertising
activities should be given the narrow,
common law tort definition, which
would preclude recovery; the trial court
agreed with Industrial.
On appeal, the First District Court of
Appeal determined that because the poli-
cy itself does not define "unfair competi-
tion," the phrase could reasonably be
defined by resort to the common law, the
broad statutory definition in Business
and Professions Code section 17200, or
the dictionary. Further, the court noted
that where a policy provision is capable
of two or more reasonable constructions,
it is inherently ambiguous and California
law compels that the ambiguity must be
resolved against the insurer in favor of
providing coverage for the insured. The
First District determined that "the trial
court violated the well accepted rules of
insurance contract interpretation by giv-
ing too restrictive a meaning to the
ambiguous policy phrase...."
Industrial contended that, when read
in context, the policy phrase "unfair
competition" was not ambiguous but,
instead, clearly meant the tort as defined
in common law. Industrial further noted
that the rule of ambiguity, if any, was not
applicable here because the Bank was
not an unsophisticated insured but rather
an institution which had equal bargain-
ing power with the insurer. The industry
also argued, more persuasively, that sec-
tion 17200 is an action in equity, and
restitution (not damages) is required of
violators to disgorge unjust enrichment.
Such disgorgement cannot be insured,
since that would allow the violator to
keep the fruits of the violation and
socialize damage through insurance cov-
erage.
On March 28, the California Supreme
Court granted review in this case. The
final outcome of this case will be
extremely important in terms of insur-
ance public policy and the direct liability
of insurance firms. Where such liability
is found, the burden will be shifted to
policyholders who will be forced to pay
higher premiums; policyholders which
are business entities will pass those high-
er premium costs on to customers.
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The Copley Press, Inc. v.
San Diego County Superior Court
228 Cal. App. 3d 77, 278 Cal. Rptr. 443,
No. DOI 1794 (Feb. 26, 1991).
Juror Questionnaires are Public
Subject to "In Camera" Hearing
In this proceeding, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal considered whether
juror questionnaires are public records
subject to in camera hearings and disclo-
sure. The issue arose during the trial of
Roberta Pearce, who was charged with
the murder of her husband. In accor-
dance with established court procedures,
detailed questionnaires-including
questions submitted by the trial attor-
neys to facilitate the voir dire pro-
cess-were distributed to 300 prospec-
tive jurors. An instruction sheet for the
questionnaire informed prospective
jurors that the information contained in
the questionnaire would become part of
the court's permanent record, but that it
would not be distributed to anyone
except the court, its staff, and the attor-
neys in the case while it is pending.
During the trial, Copley Press, Inc.
(Copley) filed a motion requesting the
court to release the questionnaires. Since
jury qualification information was com-
bined with voir dire questioning, the trial
court held that the questionnaires were
confidential and denied release. Follow-
ing the conclusion of the trial, Copley
petitioned for a peremptory writ of man-
date, which was denied. The California
Supreme Court remanded and directed
the Fourth District to vacate its opinion
and consider the matter in light of Lesh-
er Communications, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 224 Cal. App. 3d 774 (1990).
The Fourth District adopted the Lesh-
er holding insofar as that decision pro-
vides that the public or press does not
have access to jury questionnaires filled
out by prospective jurors who are not
called to the jury box for oral voir dire.
Additionally, the Fourth District deter-
mined that the questionnaires used for
the Pearce trial included both confiden-
tial information about the prospective
jurors and responses to voir dire ques-
tioning; the court held that public access
to such confidential information is not
warranted. The court concluded that the
prior blanket denial of access to the
questionnaires was unconstitutional,
because the first amendment affords the
right of access to voir dire examination
of the jury in criminal trials. However,
because of the trial court's assurance of
confidentiality to the prospective jurors
in the Pearce case, the Fourth District
denied release of the questionnaires in
this particular case based on the princi-
ple of estoppel.
Recognizing the tension between the
right of access to public information and
jurors' right to privacy, the court issued a
peremptory writ directing the superior
court in future cases to segregate juror
qualification information from other
questions; plainly instruct prospective
jurors in the questionnaire that written
responses are not confidential and that
venirepersons have the right to request
an in camera hearing to discuss
responses they do not wish to answer in
writing; and provide access to the ques-
tionnaires in accordance with the court's
holding.
Drexel v. Mann,
228 Cal. App. 3d 630, 278 Cal. Rptr 887,
No. H007204 (Mar. 15, 1991).
Law Permitting Deletion of Material
From Voter Pamphlet is Constitutional
In this proceeding, the Sixth District
Court of Appeal determined that Elec-
tions Code section 10013.5 is constitu-
tionally valid on its face. Section
10013.5 allows registered voters or the
clerk to seek a writ of mandate or injunc-
tion to amend or delete material from
candidates' statements which is false or
misleading.
In the 1990 race for Santa Clara
County District Attorney, George
Kennedy defeated Jerome Nadler. Both
candidates had submitted statements for
inclusion in the official voters' pam-
phlets pursuant to Elections Code sec-
tion 10012. During the period for public
examination of the statements, Santa
Clara voter Jeanne Drexel sought a writ
of mandate directing the registrar of vot-
ers to delete portions of Nadler's state-
ment pursuant to section 10013.5. The
trial court agreed that one of Nadler's
statements was false and/or misleading,
and issued the writ.
Nadler appealed, claiming that sec-
tion 10013.5 violates first amendment
rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitu-
tion and the free speech clause of the
California Constitution; appellant con-.
tended that he statute is an unlawful pri-
or restraint of campaign speech in a lim-
ited public forum. Respondents claimed
the issue was moot since the election
was over, but the court agreed to review
the matter since election cases often pre-
sent legal questions "capable of repeti-
tion, yet evading review."
The court determined that "the state
must have a compelling interest in excis-
ing from the voter's pamphlet material
that is false, misleading, or inconsistent
with statutory requirements." Further,
the court determined that to uphold such
a statute, the state's interest must be
more compelling than the candidate's
interest in free speech; the statute must
be narrowly drawn to effectuate the
state's interest; the party who challenges
the candidate statement must shoulder
the burden of proving that the material is
false, misleading, or non-conforming;
there must be adequate opportunity for
judicial review; and a candidate whose
statement is amended or deleted must
have ample alternative channels of com-
munication.
Applying these principles to section
10013.5, the court determined that the
statute "does not run afoul of the First
Amendment." While recognizing that
amendment or deletion of a candidate's
statement from the voter's pamphlet runs
counter to the first amendment guarantee
of free speech, the court noted that the
candidate retains the right to disseminate
the offending information through any
channel other than the official voter's
pamphlet; his/her opponent may then
respond in kind. The court thus conclud-
ed that the state's interest in assuring the
accuracy of information in the official
voter's pamphlet is more compelling
than the candidate's interest in free
speech within the voter's pamphlet.
Chemical Specialties Manufacturers
Ass'n, Inc. v. Deukmejian,
227 Cal. App. 3d 663,
278 Cal. Rptr. 128,
No. A048489 (Feb. 8, 1991).
Proposition 105 Held Invalid for
Violating Single-Subject
Rule of State Constitution
Proposition 105, the "Public's Right
to Know Act" approved by voters at the
November 1988 general election, was
struck down by the First District Court
of Appeal, which determined that the
measure violated the single-subject rule
of the state constitution. Article II, sec-
tion 8(d) of the California Constitution
provides that initiative measures which
encompass more than one subject may
not be submitted to the electors or have
any effect. However, state courts have
upheld a number of broad initiatives so
long as the "provisions are either func-
tionally related to one another or are rea-
sonably germane to one another or the
objects of the enactment."
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Proposition 105 set new requirements
for public disclosure in diverse fields,
such as the danger of dumping toxic
household products in the garbage or
down the drain; the details and quality of
"Medigap" insurance, sold to supple-
ment Medicare for the elderly; and the
major funding sources of ballot measure
advertising. Proposition 105's sponsors
argued that the initiative required affir-
mative disclosure in paid advertising,
and contended that this is a narrower
subject than measures that have been
previously upheld. Although each of the
initiative's provisions dealt with some
form of disclosure, the First District
decided that he provisions were "neither
functionally related to one another nor
reasonably germane to one another or
the objects of the enactment."
301 Ocean Avenue Corporation v.
Santa Monica Rent Control Board,
228 Cal. App. 3d 1548,
279 Cal. Rptr. 6636,
No. B047932 (Mar. 6, 1991).
Finding that Parking is Base Amenity
Affecting Landlord's Vested Control
Right Requires Independent
Judgment Review
In this proceeding, appellant, a Santa
Monica landlord, petitioned for writ of
mandate to overturn the Santa Monica
Rent Control Board's (Board) determi-
nation that parking is a base amenity for
38 of the 46 rent-controlled units in
appellant's building. The trial court
applied the substantial evidence test and
upheld the Board's determination. This
appeal followed.
The Second District Court of Appeal
stated that "[w]hen an administrative
decision substantially affects a funda-
mental vested right, the independent
judgment standard of review applies."
The court further noted that "[wihether
an administrative decision substantially
affects a fundamental vested right must
be decided on a case-by-case basis....
[T]he issue in each case is whether the
'affected right is deemed to be of suffi-
cient significance to preclude its extinc-
tion or abridgement by a body lacking
judicial power."'
The court concluded that the Board's
determination of base amenities affects
appellant's fundamental vested right to
control the use of property, and thus war-
rants the application of the independent
judgment test. Because "some 8,000
square feet of petitioner's property will
be out of petitioner's control if the trial
court's decision stands...nothing short of
independent review by the court of the
entire record will protect the constitu-
tional right to control one's own proper-
ty." The court thus reversed the judg-
ment and remanded the case back to the
trial court.
*
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